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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was Garl Cottam an underinsured motorist and thus an 
uninsured motorist when his automobile insurance policy had limits 
of liability which were $50,000 less than the limits of liability 
in the Aetna Policy covering Verna Dice? The interpretation of an 
insurance contract is a question of law. As stated in Appellant's 
brief, the trial court's decision is given no particular weight by 
this court and is reviewed with a "correction of error" standard. 
LPS v. Capitol Life Insurance, 765 P.2d 857 (Utah 1988). 
2. Is the reduction clause in the Aetna policy reducing the 
amount of uninsured motorist coverage available by 1 hi amount of 
payments by the tort-feasor's insurer ambiguous and unenforce-able? 
As stated in the Appellant's brief, the interpretation of an 
insurance contract is A question of law and the trial court's 
decision is given no particular weight by this court and is 
reviewed with a "correction of error" standard. LPS v. Capitol 
Life Insurance, 765 P.2d 857 (Utah 1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AND 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann § ilA-22-305(3) (1986). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts on appeal in this case are essentially as stated by 
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Appellant (hereinafter "Aetna") . 
In addition to those facts set forth by Aetna, the following 
additional facts were undisputed by Aetna at the trial court: 
Following the accident, Aetna authorized Verna Dice to accept 
the settlement of $50,000 from Farmer's Insurance Company without 
prejudice to her rights under the uninsured provisions of the Aetna 
Policy. (R. 47). 
As a result of the automobile accident, Verna Dice suffered 
partial paraplegic injuries, resulting in medical services valued 
at over $50,000 and actual damages well in excess of $100,000. (R. 
48) . 
At the time of the accident, Verna Dice was living with her 
roommate, Debbie Larson, in Utah County, and the vehicle was 
principally garaged in Utah County at the time the accident 
occurred. (R. 2-3). 
At the time of this accident, Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-
305 required uninsured motorist coverage limits of at least $20,000 
per person. (R. 48). 
The Aetna Policy covering the Larson vehicle, in which Verna 
Dice was riding, did not set forth a policy limit for underinsured 
motorist coverage, but only set forth one policy limit for an 
2 
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uninsured motorist coverage. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 10; R. 
18) . 
The Aetna policy had limits for bodily injury liability of 
$100,000 as shown on the declaration sheet. (R. 20). 
Aetna's quotation of the additional definition for an unin-
sured motor vehicle is inaccurate. The amendment actually read as 
follows: 
2. Item 5. is added to the definition of "Unin-
sured motor vehicle": 
5. Which is an underinsured motor vehicle. 
An underinsured motor vehicle is a land 
motor vehicle or trailer of any type to 
which a bodily injury liability bond or 
policy applies; however, its limit for 
bodily injury liability must be less than 
the limit of liability for this coverage. 
(See Aetna's Motion for Summary Judgment at R. 18). 
The beginning of the Aetna Uninsured Motorist Insuring Agree-
ment refers to all damages the injured pdrty can recover from the 
tort-feasor. The policy states as follows: 
We will pay damages which a covered person is 
legally entitled to recover from the owner or 
operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because 
of bodily injury: 
1. Sustained by a covered person; and 
2. Caused by an accident. 
"All damages for bodily injury" is again referred to just prior to 
the reduction clause under paragraph 3B of the Uninsured Motorist 
3 
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Coverage. (See Brief of Appellant, Addendum, Aetna Policy 
Amendment and p. 6 of Policy). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Aetna policy clearly had a limit for bodily injury 
liability of $100,000. The additional definition of an uninsured 
motor vehicle required that the vehicle which injured Verna Dice 
must have a bodily injury liability limit which is less than the 
limit of liability "for this coverage." Aetna attempts to deny 
payment to Verna Dice by disputing which limit of liability "this 
coverage" is actually referring to. 
Utah law requires that the term "this coverage" be interpreted 
as an average person would interpret it. The reasonable definition 
of the word "this" makes it clear that the reference to the "limit 
of liability for this coverage" is referring to the Aetna bodily 
injury liability limit. At a minimum, the Aetna definition is 
susceptible to more than one plausible and reasonable meaning and 
is therefore ambiguous under Utah law. Therefore, the provision 
must be construed in favor of coverage for Verna Dice and against 
Aetna as the drafter responsible for the ambiguity. 
The reduction provision in the Aetna policy is ambiguous and 
attempts to reduce the uninsured motorist limit set forth in the 
policy (there is no underinsured motorist limit) to zero. Other 
4 
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courts have recognized that the language utilized by Aetna in its 
reduction clause is capable ol two or more plausible meanings. 
When there is some support in the case law to show that a provision 
is susceptible to more than one plausible meaning, the language 
must be found to be ambiguous. In addition to being against public 
policy and ambiguous, the provision is deceptive and against the 
insured's reasonable expectations since it represents that a 
certain limit of liability is available titidet 1 he policy. However, 
in the case of an underinsured motorist, Aetna would never be 
required to pay that policy limit since it would always reduce the 
limit by at least the minimum limits of liability required in any 
given state. Therefore, the Aetna reduction clause is ambiguous 
and unenforceable and the judgment of the trial court awarding 
$50,000 in uninsured motorist bene!its to Verna Dice should be 
affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. GARL COTTAM WAS AN UNINSURED MOTORIST 
AS DEFINED BY THE AETNA POLICY. 
As stated by the appellant in its brief, the Aetna policy 
covering t tie vehicle it which \)**xr\a Dice was riding had a limit for 
bodily injury liability of $100,000 and an uninsured motorist limit 
of $50,000. The amendment utilized by Aetna in its policy added 
«i definition oJ an uninsured motor vehicle as follows: 
5 
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2. Item 5. is added to the definition of "Uninsured 
motor vehicle": 
5. Which is an underinsured motor vehicle. 
An underinsured motor vehicle is a land 
motor vehicle or trailer of any type to 
which a bodily injury liability bond or 
policy applies; however, its limit for 
bodily injury liability must be less than 
the limit of liability for this coverage. 
(See, Aetna Amendment at R. 18). 
This provision compares the limit for bodily injury liability 
of the tort-feasor with the limit of liability for bodily injury 
of the Aetna policy to determine if Garl Cottam was, indeed, 
underinsured. In interpreting policy language, it is clear that 
the common understanding of a term by a reasonable person with an 
ordinary understanding should be used. See. Draughon v. Cuna 
Mutual Insurance Society, 771 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1989); LPS 
Hospital v. Capitol Life Insurance, 765 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1988). 
To determine which limit of liability is referred to by the 
term "this coverage", it is helpful to refer to the dictionary 
definition of the word "this" as set forth in Aetna's first 
memorandum filed with the trial court. "The term 'this' as defined 
by Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (copyright 1971) is 
'the person, thing or idea present or near in place, time, or 
thought or just mentioned.1" (See, definition in Aetna's first 
Memorandum at R. 23). In reviewing the fifth policy definition of 
6 
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an uninsured motor vehicle to determine which limit of liability 
is being discussed, it is clear that the tort-feasor's bodily 
injury limit of liability is mentioned just five (5) words previous 
to the phrase in question. Therefore, the Aetna policy requires 
a comparison of the bodily injury liability limits of the tort-
feasor's vehicle and the covered vehicle to determine if the tort-
feasor was underinsured. The whole discussion in paragraph five 
is in reference to bodily injury liability coverage. Therefore, 
a reasonable person with ordinary understanding would construe this 
uninsured motorist definition to state that the tort-feasor's 
"limit for bodily injury liability must be less than the limit of 
bodily injury liability for this coverage." 
It is interesting to note that even though the ordinary 
meaning of the word "this" is determinative language, Aetna's brief 
is conspiciously absent any definition of the word "this" as 
understood by the average person. 
Aetna contends that the limit of liability to which the policy 
refers is the $50,000 uninsured motorist limit of liability instead 
of the $100,000 limit for bodily injury liability. At a minimum, 
the language used by Aetna in its fifth definition of an uninsured 
motor vehicle is ambiguous under Utah law. Language is considered 
ambiguous if "the words used to express the meaning and intention 
of the parties are insufficient in a sense that the contract may 
7 
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be understood to reach two or more plausible meanings." Crowther 
v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah App. 1989); Metropolitan 
Property and Liability v. Finlayson, 751 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah App. 
1988) (vacated as moot) (citing Central Security Mutual Insurance 
v. DePinto, 235 Kan. 331, 681 P.2d 15, 17 (1984). It is not 
necessary that Verna Dice's interpretation of the policy be more 
reasonable than Aetna's interpretation. The only requirement for 
a showing of ambiguity is if the words used to express the meaning 
and intention of the parties may be understood to reach two or more 
plausible meanings. 
Aetna could easily have made the language unambiguous by 
replacing the ambiguous words "limit of liability for this 
coverage" with the more specific words, "limit of liability for 
this uninsured motorist coverage", if that is what Aetna truly 
intended. 
Other policies in cases cited by Aetna in its brief, as well 
as several statutes enacted in other jurisdictions, have recognized 
the necessity of specifically identifying the policy limit with 
which the tort-feasor's liability limit is to be compared. In 
United Community Insurance v. Mucatel, 487 N.Y.S.2d 959, 960 (Sup. 
1985), the court reviewed an Underinsured Motorist Statute which 
specifically required the tort-feasor's liability limits to be 
compared to the insured's liability limits. Id. at 960, (Tort-
8 
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feasor's liability limits must be "less than the liability limits 
under the insured's own policy.") See also, Tate v. Secura 
Insurance. 561 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ind. App. 1990) (bodily injury 
liability limit must be less than "the amount of total damages 
uninsured person is legally entitled to recover") Giardino v, 
American Family Insurance, 164 111. App. 3d 389, 517 N.E.2d 1187, 
1188 (1987) (bodily injury limit must be "less than the damage you 
are legally entitled to recover"); Miller v. Duthu, 470 So.2d 500, 
503 (La. App. 1985) (liability limits are "insufficient to satisfy 
the damages sustained by the insured"); Berqtholdt v. Farmer's 
Insurance, 691 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Mo. App. 1985) (uninsured motor 
vehicle is "a motor vehicle where there is bodily injury liability 
insurance . . . but in amounts less than the limits carried by the 
insured under Underinsured Motorist Coverage"); Rutherford v. 
Tennessee Farmer's Mutual Insurancef 608 S.W.2d 843, 844 (Tenn. 
1980) (liability limit must be "less than the limits of the 
uninsured motor vehicle coverage carried by [the] insured under 
this policy"). 
Several of the cases and statutes cited by the appellant also 
refer to statutory language wherein the drafters recognized the 
need to specifically refer to the limit of liability to which the 
tort-feasor's bodily injury liability is to be compared in 
determining whether it is an uninsured/underinsured motor vehicle. 
9 
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See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 28.20.445(h)(1) (bodily injury limit of 
liability must be "less than the limit for uninsured and 
underinsured motorist's coverage"); Fla. Stat. § 627.727(3) (1973) 
(bodily injury liability limit must be "less than the limits 
applicable to the injured person provided under uninsured motorist 
coverage"); Ga. Code Ann. § 33-7-ll(b)(1)(D) (bodily injury 
liability limits must be "less than the limits of the uninsured 
motorist coverage"); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Title 24-A, § 2902(1) 
(bodily injury liability limit must be "less than the limits of the 
injured party's uninsured vehicle coverage"); Md. Ins. Ann. Code 
art. 48 A, § 541(c)(1) (1986 Repl. Vol.) (bodily injury liability 
limit must be "less than the amount of coverage provided to the 
insured under this subsection"); Minn. Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 17 
(1986) (bodily injury liability limits must be "less than the 
amount needed to compensate the insured for actual damages"); N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 17:28-1.le (bodily injury liability limits must be 
"less than the applicable limits for underinsured motorist 
coverage"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3937.18(2) (bodily injury 
liability limit must be "less than the limits for the insured's 
uninsured motorist coverage"); Okla. Stat. Tit. 36 § 3636 (bodily 
injury liability limits must be "less than the amount of the claim 
of the person or persons making such claim"); Texas Stat. Art. 
5.06-1(2)(b) (bodily injury liability limit must be "less than the 
10 
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limit of liability stated in the underinsured coverage of the 
insured's policy11); Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-2206(c) (bodily injury 
limits must be "less than the total amount of uninsured motorist 
coverage"); W. Va. Code § 33-6-31(b)(i) (bodily injury liability 
limit must be "less than the limits the insured carried for 
underinsured motorist coverage"). 
Given the vast number of cases and policies which have seen 
fit to clearly distinguish which limit of liability or other figure 
the tort-feasorfs limit of liability is to be compared to, Aetna 
plainly could have drafted its policy similar to these other 
policies and statutes to eliminate the ambiguity. Since it did 
not, the ambiguity must be construed under the plausible meaning 
most favorable to the insured. LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life 
Insurance, 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). 
To construe the ambiguous provision in favor of Verna Dice, 
the limit for bodily injury liability of the Farmer's coverage 
($50,000) must be less than the limit of liability for bodily 
injury under the Aetna coverage ($100,000). Since this is the 
case, the Garl Cottam vehicle was an underinsured motor vehicle 
under the Aetna provisions. As an underinsured motor vehicle, the 
Cottam vehicle is, by explicit definition under the policy, an 
uninsured motor vehicle. Therefore, Verna Dice is entitled to 
$50,000 of uninsured motor vehicle coverage provided under the 
11 
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Aetna policy, unless such liability is excluded by other 
provisions. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that when the 
insured 
brings himself within the insuring clause, he 
has made his case . . . and any exceptions or 
conditions which would then deny him relief, 
take him out of the indemnity provisions, 
render them inoperative as to him, are matters 
of defense, and the burden thereof rests upon 
the insurer . . . . 
LPS Hospital, 765 P.2d at 859 (citation omitted). 
The court should note that once the ambiguity is construed in 
favor of Verna Dice, the coverage which becomes applicable is 
Uninsured Motorist Coverage and not Underinsured Motorist Coverage. 
In its brief, Aetna attempts to distort the language of the policy 
by repeatedly referring to underinsured motorist coverage. 
Appellant even goes so far as to suggest that the fourth definition 
of an uninsured motor vehicle, as required by Utah's uninsured 
motorist statute, constitutes some sort of underinsured motorist 
coverage for vehicles which are insured by a liability bond or 
policy, but for less than the required limits of $20,000. 
The Utah Code specifically defines such a vehicle as an 
uninsured (not underinsured) motor vehicle. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
22-305(2)(a) (1986). When a Utah statute sets forth a definition 
for an uninsured motorist, that definition cannot be ignored or 
construed as underinsured motorist coverage instead. By the same 
12 
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token, Aetna should not be allowed to write a policy which adds a 
definition as to what constitutes an Uninsured Motor Vehicle under 
the Uninsured Motorist Coverage, and then simply ignore the 
definition agreed to by the parties. The Aetna policy defined the 
Cottam vehicle as an uninsured motor vehicle and it cannot now seek 
favorable treatment of these legal issues by reclassifying the 
coverage offered as underinsured motorist coverage. The policy 
clearly provides no separate premium or limit of liability for 
underinsured motorist coverage. 
POINT II. THE AETNA POLICY PROVISION FOR OFFSET 
OF UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE IS 
AMBIGUOUS, AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY, AND 
AGAINST THE INSURED'S REASONABLE 
EXPECTATIONS. 
After setting forth the five definitions of an uninsured 
motorist, the Aetna policy sets forth the following offset 
provision: 
. . . Any amounts otherwise payable for damages 
under this coverage shall be reduced by: 
1. All sums paid because of the bodily 
injury by or on behalf of persons or 
organizations who may be legally responsible. 
This includes all sums paid under the Liability 
Coverage of this policy; and 
2. All sums paid or payable because of 
the bodily injury under any: 
a. Workers1 compensation law; 
b. Disability benefits law; or 
c. Law similar to a. or b. above. 
13 
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The beginning of the Aetna Uninsured Motorist Insuring 
Agreement refers to all damages the injured party can recover from 
the tort-feasor. The policy states as follows: 
We will pay damages which a covered person is 
legally entitled to recover from the owner or 
operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because 
of bodily injury: 
1. Sustained by a covered person; and 
2. Caused by an accident. 
"All damages for bodily injury" is again referred to just prior to 
the reduction clause under paragraph 3B of the Uninsured Motorist 
Coverage. 
Verna Dice submits that the phrase "any amounts otherwise 
payable for damages" refers to the total damages suffered by Verna 
Dice as a result of the accident as stated in the reference to 
general damages at the beginning of the Uninsured Motorist Insuring 
Agreement and in subsection 3B of the Limit of Liability section, 
which refers to "all damages for bodily injury resulting from one 
accident." This is a reasonable and plausible interpretation of 
the policy. By failing to dispute the Statement of Facts in Dice's 
memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment in the lower court, Aetna 
has admitted that 
As a result of the automobile accident, which 
is the subject of this action, Verna Dice 
suffered partial paraplegic injuries, creating 
injuries requiring medical services valued over 
$50,000 and actual damages well in excess of 
$100,000. 
14 
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(R. 48). Since Verna Dice's damages are admitted to exceed 
$100,000, any application of the otherwise invalid offset provision 
would still leave well in excess of $50,000 of Verna Dice's damages 
uncompensated. Therefore, Aetna should be required to pay the full 
$50,000 uninsured motorist benefit as ruled by the lower court. 
A. THE AETNA REDUCTION CLAUSE IS AMBIGUOUS AND MUST BE 
CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF COVERAGE FOR VERNA DICE. 
Aetna has cited this court to several cases wherein such a 
policy provision was construed so that the offset is subtracted 
from the uninsured policy limit instead of the claimant's total 
damages. This interpretation is contrary to the very meaning of 
being "underinsured." Under Aetna's interpre-tation, the insured 
has not been injured by an "underinsured motorist" even if his 
damages far exceed the policy limits of both the tort-feasor and 
his own policy. This contradicts the most obvious meaning of the 
word "underinsured motor vehicle." At best, the Aetna offset 
provision is ambiguous as to whether the offset is against the UM 
limit or the injured party's total damages. 
It is only logical to conclude that when various courts have 
already considered the language in question, although the cases are 
not controlling for Utah, they certainly indicate that a particular 
interpretation is, in fact, reasonable and plausible. Aetna cites 
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numerous cases in its brief for support of its offset provision 
which are inapplicable to the language before this court. 
Obviously, cases which are governed by a statute which requires an 
offset from the under insured motorist limit have no bearing on this 
issue in Utah, since Utah has no statutory requirement for 
underinsured motorist coverage. 
Fortunately, to determine if this language is ambiguous, it 
is not necessary to determine which interpretation is the 
"majority" rule in order to determine if the language is ambiguous. 
The few cases cited by Aetna which involve similar contract 
provisions and the absence of any governing statute are merely 
evidence that Aetna's interpretation of the policy is "plausible." 
This principal was aptly outlined by the two dissenting justices 
in Aetna Casualty & Surety v. Kenner, 570 A.2d 1172 (Del. 1990), 
cited by appellant in its brief. 
It is unnecessary for me to consider whether 
the majority reasonably interprets the policy. 
I dissent because it is not the only reasonable 
interpretation, as evidenced by the plain lan-
guage of the contract, judicial decisions in-
terpreting similar provisions, and public 
policy considerations. If our laws were 
different, and courts were required to deter-
mine which interpretation was more reasonable, 
one might criticize the majority's inordinate 
focus on the words "under this coverage" to 
achieve its interpretation of the policy. 
I have already noted above that two reasonable 
interpretations of the policy language are 
possible. Courts interpreting nearly identical 
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policy provisions under similar circumstances 
have also been unable to reach a consensus as 
to their meaning. [The dissent cites numerous 
varying cases, pro and con.] The sheer number 
and diversity of these decisions strongly 
suggests that the disputed policy language is 
capable of more than one reasonable interpre-
tation, particularly since one of the cases 
involved wording identical to that found here. 
Moreover, if the reduction clause were meant 
to apply to policy limits rather than total 
damages, it would have explicitly referred to 
them. . . . In the absence of such limiting 
language, Aetna's policy does not unambiguously 
require monies received from a tort-feasor to 
be offset against policy limits rather than 
against total damages. Being susceptible of 
two reasonable interpretations, the policy is 
ambiguous, and should be interpreted against 
Aetna. 
Kenner at 1178-1179 (Moore, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
Following the reasoning of the Kenner dissent and under Utah 
law with respect to ambiguities, several courts have reviewed 
language similar to the offset provision used by Aetna and found 
it to be ambiguous. In Weber v. American Family Mutual Insurance. 
868 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1989), the plaintiff had collected coverage 
from the tort-feasor in the amount of $100,000. As a passenger in 
the car in which he was insured, the plaintiff then sued his 
insurance company under the $100,000 underinsured motorist 
coverage. The court rejected the insurance company's attempt to 
offset the underinsured policy limit with the payment received from 
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the tort-feasor. Instead, the Weber court found that the language 
required that the plaintiff's total damages should be reduced by 
the amount paid by the tort-feasor, and the balance paid by the 
underinsured coverage subject to the stated limit of liability. 
The court stated: 
Any other analysis would render the policy term 
"underinsured motor vehicle11 meaningless or at 
least, misleading. For instance, under American 
Family's interpretation, an insured, such as 
Weber, would never reach the limits of liabil-
ity set forth in the underinsured motorist cov-
erage endorsement of the contract unless the 
insured was dealing with an uninsured motorist 
rather than an underinsured motorist. 
Id. at 288 (emphasis added). This approach recognizes "the need 
to afford the insured the protection he or she endeavored to secure 
by paying premiums." LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Insurance, 765 
P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). 
In Mulliss v. American Protection Insurance, 653 F.Supp. 685 
(D.Vt. 1987), the Vermont District Court was faced with an almost 
identical offset provision. The insurance company made the same 
arguments which Aetna makes in this case, attempting to offset its 
uninsured motorist benefits by any amounts collected by the 
plaintiff from the tort-feasor's liability carriers. Id. at 687. 
In rejecting the defendant's argument, the Mulliss court stated: 
In the instant case, the disputed policy 
language appears to be susceptible to two pos-
sible interpretations. On the one hand, we 
agree with the plaintiff that the word "dam-
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ages" in the offset-reduction clause could 
easily be interpreted as referring to all 
"damages which a covered person is legally 
entitled to recover", (emphasis applied) as 
stated in the broad language of the Insuring 
Agreement of Part C. On the other hand, it is 
possible to interpret the words "damage under 
this coverage" in the offset-reduction clause 
to mean simply that the $40,000 limit of cov-
erage under the policy shall be reduced by all 
payments made by or on behalf of the tort-
feasor. 
Having determined that the language in 
this exclusionary clause is susceptible to two 
different interpretations, we are bound to 
adopt the construction which is most favorable 
to the insured. 
Id. at 688 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
The Mulliss court specifically found that the use of the word 
"damages" in the offset-reduction clause modified the first 
sentence of the insuring agreement 
in which the insurer agrees to "pay damages 
which the insured is legally entitled to re-
cover." This interpretation is consistent with 
the "Limit of Liability" clause in Part C of 
defendant's policy. Forty-thousand dollars is 
still defendant's "maximum limit of liability 
for all damages resulting from any one acci-
dent ." (emphasis supplied). 
Id. at 689. It is interesting to note the Mulliss court's 
observation that "most of the cases cited by defendant in support 
of its interpretation of the offset-reduction clause are 
inapplicable to our decision here. The court's decision cited by 
defendant relied heavily on statutoirv interpretation in order to 
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decide for the defendant insurance companies.11 Id. at 691 n.6 
(original emphasis). 
In Kaun v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance, 148 Wis.2d 
662, 436 N.W.2d 321 (1989), the Wisconsin Supreme Court construed 
a similar policy provision which required that "Amounts payable 
will be reduced by . . . ."by stating that: 
A reasonable person in the position of an 
insured would understand the words "amounts 
payable" to be the equivalent of damages 
compensable because when purchasing UIM 
coverage, we believe that a reasonable insured 
expects to be protected against a loss caused 
by another that is not covered by the under-
insured driver's liability coverage. 
Furthermore, this interpretation is consistent 
with the purpose of UIM coverage as announced 
by this court. 
Id. at 325« The Kaun court also found that under the insurance 
company's position "an underinsured liability limit is an illusion 
because an insured will never be entitled to recover up to that 
limit." Id. at 324. See also. Wood v. American Family Mutual 
Insurance, 148 Wis.2d 639, 436 N.W.2d 594 (1989). 
As contrasted in Aetna's brief, the Wisconsin Appellate Court 
was willing to uphold a reduction clause that unambiguously 
referred to the "limits of liability" as the figure that was to be 
reduced instead of the ambiguous language chosen by Aetna in this 
policy. ("Any amounts otherwise payable for damages under this 
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coverage.") Smith v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance, 444 N.W.2d 465 
(Wis. App. 1989) . This is a perfect contrast with Kaun, 436 N.W.2d 
at 325, where the policy failed to specifically mention the "Limits 
of Liability" as the figure to be offset but only referred to 
"amounts payable." Yet, both cases were from the same jurisdic-
tion. See also. Wood v. American Family Mutual Insurance, 436 
N.W.2d 594, 599-600 (Wis. 1989) (construing same language in favor 
of insured). 
The Michigan Appellate Court in Michigan Mutual Liability Co. 
v. Karstn. 13 Mich. App. 46, 163 N.W.2d 670 (1969) was faced with 
an offset clause which required "any amount payable under the terms 
of this part because of bodily injuries sustained in an accident 
by a person who is an insured under this part, shall be reduced by 
. . . ." Id. at 672. The insurance company in Karstn asserted 
the same construction of the language as set forth Aetnafs brief. 
However, the court stated that: 
The subsections of the provision independently 
modify the main clause of section (H) which 
directs the company to pay "all sums" recover-
able as damages. Therefore, the settlement 
amount from the insured motorist must be 
subtracted from the total damages arising out 
of the accident. Support for this construction 
is supplied both by the principals of construc-
tion set forth in the Francis case, supra, and 
Michigan Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. 
Messner (1966), 2 Mich. App. 350, 139 N.W.2d 
913, which construed the subsections of a 
nearly-identical insurance policy provision as 
independently modifying the section's main 
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clause. 
We agree with the lower court's ruling that the 
plaintiff is liable for the amount of damages 
suffered, reduced by the settlement amount, the 
liability not to exceed $10,000. 
Karstn, 163 N.W.2d at 672-73. 
Again, in Drapak v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, 520 N.Y.S.2d 303 
(N.Y. 1987) and United Community Insurance v. Mucatel, 487N.Y.S.2d 
959 (N.Y. 1985), two New York Supreme Court judges ruled that the 
reduction in coverage clauses resulted in a misleading and 
ambiguous situation since the carrier providing the coverage would 
never pay the full amount indicated on the policy declaration. 
Drapak at 305 and Mucatel at 961. Both policy provisions were 
similar to the Aetna policy. 
Finally, in Gomolka v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co., 
15 Ohio St. 3d 27, 472 N.E. 2d 700 (1984), the Ohio Supreme Court 
was faced with this identical issue. The insurance company there 
argued that its uninsured motorist coverage should be reduced by 
any amounts paid by the tort-feasor's insurer. Id. at 702. The 
insured argued that the amounts paid by the tort-feasor should only 
be deducted against the total damages suffered by the insured and 
that "any amount payable" should be interpreted to mean "any 
damages compensable." Id. The court stated as follows: 
We find this later interpretation clearly to 
be the most reasonable. 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant's "interpretation" is, in reality, 
an "insertion." State Auto would have the 
court read additional terms into its policy. 
The appellee's interpretation, however, equates 
"amount payable" to "damages compensable" by 
looking at the plain meaning of the policy's 
terms and by focusing on the nature and purpose 
of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. 
When purchasing this coverage, an insured 
expects to be protected against a loss caused 
by another that is not covered by that person • s 
insurer. Thus, an "amount payable" under 
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage is an 
amount of damages suffered by the insured, 
which amount is greater than the insurance 
coverage held by the party causing the damages. 
Even if there were some doubt as to the 
propriety of appellee's interpretation of her 
policy, however, this doubt still would be 
resolved in her favor. As we noted in Gomolka 
X, [citation omitted] "[l]anguage in a contract 
of insurance reasonably susceptible of more 
than one meaning will be construed liberally 
in favor of the insured and strictly against 
the insurer." [Citation omitted]. This rule 
of construction, in combination with the plain 
meaning of the policy terms in question, makes 
it clear that State Auto may only utilize the 
$100,000 payment to the appellee as a set off 
against the total damages suffered by her 
family. 
Gomolka, 472 N.E. 2d at 702-03 (emphasis added) (reversed to the 
extent Gomolka implied that unambiguous reduction clauses were not 
permissible, In re: Nationwide Insurance Co. . 45 Ohio St.3d 11, 
543 N.E.2d 89, 92 (1989)). These numerous cases clearly show that 
Aetna's offset provision is susceptible to more than one 
interpretation and is ambiguous. The phrase must therefore be 
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construed in favor of coverage for Verna Dice so as to deduct the 
$50,000 payment from Farmer's from her total damages, which exceed 
$50,000. 
B. AETNA'S OFFSET PROVISION VIOLATES PUBLIC POLICY. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302 (1986) requires that every policy 
of insurance purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's 
security requirement of § 41-12A-301 shall include: "(b) uninsured 
motorist coverage under § 31A-22-305, unless affirmatively waived 
under subsection 31A-22-305(4)." Id. The Utah Code requires that 
uninsured motorist coverage provide for uninsured limits of at 
least $20,000 for the bodily injury of one person. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-305(3) (1986). Under its policy, Aetna provided only an 
uninsured motorist limit of liability. There is no underinsured 
motorist liability limit or separate premium charged for that 
coverage. The Aetna policy simply includes in the definition of 
an uninsured motor vehicle its definition of an underinsured motor 
vehicle. 
Since Verna Dice meets one of the definitions of an uninsured 
motor vehicle under the policy, she is entitled to the uninsured 
motorist limit of liability under the Aetna policy. However, under 
appellant's interpretation of the reduction clause, Aetna is 
attempting to reduce the uninsured motorist coverage under the 
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policy to zero, well below the $20,000 minimum required by the Utah 
Code. In its brief, Aetna argues that the offset clause only 
operates under the "underinsured motorist" definition and would not 
reduce any statutorily required uninsured motorist coverage. 
However, there is no provision in the Aetna policy which restricts 
the effects of the reduction clause only to underinsured motor 
vehicles. In fact, under Aetna's interpretation of the language, 
the reduction applies to any uninsured motorist benefits which are 
paid. Thus, if a claimant such as Verna Dice were injured by an 
out-of-state vehicle carrying less than $20,000 in liability 
limits, and her vehicle only had $20,000 in uninsured motorist 
coverage, Aetna's interpretation of the reduction clause would 
reduce the $20,000 statutory minimum of UM coverage by whatever she 
received from the "uninsured motorist." In addition, Aetna's 
interpretation of the reduction clause also purports to reduce its 
uninsured motorist limit by worker's compensation or disability 
payments. Such a reduction could clearly reduce the uninsured 
motorist limit well below the required statutory minimum. 
Therefore, Aetna's interpretation of the reduction clause would be 
void as against public policy. 
Utah law requires that such provisions be construed "so as to 
harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, which terms 
should be given effect if it is possible to do so." LPS Hospital 
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v. Capitol Life Insurance, 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) (emphasis 
added). It is unnecessary to void the Aetna provision as contrary 
to public policy since an alternative and more reasonable 
interpretation of the policy is plausible as was discussed in 
Subsection A. Therefore, the provision should be construed so as 
to avoid violating public policy and becoming VOID. However, if 
this court were to hold that the policy provision reduced the 
uninsured motorist benefit below the statutory minimum required 
under Utah law, then the provision should be entirely read out of 
the policy and Verna Dice should be entitled to the full $50,000 
uninsured motorist limit. Nowhere in the trial court record did 
Aetna ever raise the issue that the reduction clause should be 
voided only to the extent it attempts to reduce the uninsured 
motorist coverage to below $20,000. Therefore, this issue was not 
preserved in the record or in its docketing statement for appeal. 
It is improper for Aetna to attempt to raise this issue for the 
first time on appeal. Park City Utah Court v. Ensign Co. . 586 P.2d 
446 (Utah 1978); Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 
(1971). 
C. AETNA1 S INTERPRETATION OF THE OFFSET PROVISION IS AGAINST 
THE REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF AN INSURED. 
Several of the cases cited in the preceding section indicated 
that the amounts received by an injured party must be offset only 
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against his total damages. These cases so held because any other 
construction would be contrary to the reasonable expectation of the 
insured and the very basic understanding of what being "under-
insured" is all about. Gomolka, 472 N.E.2d at 703 (with under-
insured coverage, "insured expects to be protected against a loss 
caused by another that is not covered by that other person's 
insurer."); Kaun, 436 N.W.2d at 325 ("Insured expects to be 
protected against a loss caused by another that is not covered by 
the underinsured driver's liability coverage."). The Utah 
Appellate Court has also recognized the expectations of an insured 
in interpreting a contract of insurance. Wagner v. Farmer's 
Insurance Exchange. 786 P.2d 763 (Utah App. 1990). In Wagner. the 
court stated that: 
There are circumstances when the reasonable 
expectations of the insured may counteract a 
clear exclusion in the policy. [citation 
omitted] . . . . 
Provisions that are against public policy or 
against the reasonable expectation of the 
parties may be found void in appropriate 
circumstances. 
Wagner, 786 P.2d at 766. 
Whether Verna Dice is a "covered person" as defined in the 
policy or a "named insured" is irrelevant to the expectations of 
what the policy means. If it were true that only the named insured 
who purchased the policy could form reasonable expectations which 
27 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
would construe the policy, then a situation would exist where the 
same policy provides different coverage for a purchasing insured 
than for a non-purchasing insured, both of which could be riding 
in the same vehicle. Parents would be entitled to different 
coverage than their children. Such a result is contrary to the 
purpose of auto insurance, which is purchased not only to protect 
the purchaser, but also any third parties riding in or using the 
vehicle with the insured1s permission. If he expects such coverage 
for himself, he also expects it for third party beneficiaries of 
the policy. 
In this case, Aetna knew of such an expectation, since it is 
created by its own choice of the term "underinsured" and such an 
expectation is reasonable in light of the average person's 
understanding of the meaning of "underinsured." Also, Aetna should 
know of their insured's expectations since cases on both sides of 
the issue have been cited which involved Aetna and these very 
policy provisions in other jurisdictions. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee Verna Dice asks this Court to affirm the trial 
court's decision and entry of judgment against Aetna for $50,000 
of uninsured motorist coverage, plus interest and costs. The trial 
court's decision was correct because the Aetna policy requires the 
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tort-feasor's limit of bodily injury liability to be less than the 
limit of bodily injury liability under the Aetna policy in order 
to qualify for uninsured motorist benefits. At a minimum, Aetna's 
definition of an "underinsured motor vehicle" is ambiguous and 
should be construed in favor of coverage. All but one of the 
underinsured motorist cases cited in Point I of Aetna's brief had 
no reason to discuss the "less than the limits of liability for 
this coverage" language since all but one of those cases involved 
underinsured motorist coverage which exceeded the tort-feasor's 
limits of liability. 
The policy language and reasonable definitions applied to that 
language clearly make Verna Dice's interpretation of the policy 
more plausible than the interpretation set forth by Aetna. 
Therefore, Verna Dice was injured by an uninsured motor vehicle 
under the policy definition. Since Verna Dice has established that 
she is entitled to uninsured motorist coverage, the burden shifts 
to Aetna to show that she is not entitled to those benefits. 
Aetna's burden cannot be met with a reduction clause which has 
been reasonably construed by numerous courts in favor of Verna 
Dice. The best Aetna can show is contrary interpretations which 
would only be evidence of the ambiguity of the provision. The 
policy should not be construed in such a way as to violate public 
policy by reducing the uninsured motorist benefit, as specifically 
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defined by Aetna, to below the statutory minimum protection for 
uninsured motorist coverage. 
Therefore, Appellee Verna Dice respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the trial court's decision and entry of judgment, with 
costs awarded to Appellee. 
DATED this 15th day of July, 1991. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was hand-delivered this 15th day of July, 1991, 
to: 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, #700 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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